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 Has assistance from USAID been successful in promoting and sustaining democracy?  
Evidence from the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia 
 
Andreas Freytag and Jac C. Heckelman* 
 
Abstract: 
Foreign aid, especially official development assistance (ODA), has received increasing criticism in 
past decades. In particular, it has been put into question if and to what extent aid can help foster the 
aims for which it has been paid. In most cases, it seems that there is no discernable effect or even a 
negative effect of ODA on economic development. One reason for aid ineffectiveness may be seen in 
a  lack  of  good  governance  on  the  side  of  the  recipients.  It  has  been  argued  that  aid  should 
concentrate more on creating better institutions. In the past 20 years, democracy promotion has 
become a pillar of USAID’s mission and the funding for democracy and governance has steadily 
increased. The transition economies in particular have received special attention upon the fall of 
the  Soviet  Union.  We  assess  the  success  of  this  aid  by  testing  whether  US  aid  is  enhancing 
democracy in 26 transition countries. Using Freedom House Nations in Transit data, we find that in 
simple linear panel regressions aid has generally not been a significant factor in a country’s overall 
democracy  score.  However,  aid  has  significantly  contributed  to  certain  components  of  the 
democracy  score,  namely  civil  society,  electoral  process,  judicial  framework,  and  media 
independence. In addition, the impact of aid is found to depend on the number of years of past 
central  planning.  Countries  having  a  history  of  less  than  50  years  of  central  planning  had  a 
significantly  negative  association  to  aid, whereas countries with more  than  65  years of  central 
planning benefited from greater aid. 
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1.  Introduction 
Foreign aid, especially official development assistance (ODA), has received increasing criticism in 
past decades. In particular, it has been put into question if and to what extent aid can help foster the 
aims for which it has been paid. In most cases, it seems that there is no discernable effect or even a 
negative effect of ODA on economic development (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009). It also appears 
that this result has long been known in both the donor and recipient countries. Nevertheless, the 
demand and supply of ODA is still high. The public choice literature on the determinants of ODA has 
revealed mainly political and strategic reasons for distributing foreign aid (Vaubel 1991, Dreher et 
al. 2008) rather than being based on economic need.   
Another reason for aid ineffectiveness may be seen in a lack of good governance on the side of the 
recipients. Some have argued that aid should concentrate more on creating better institutions and 
fostering  democracy  (Nielsen  and  Nielson  2008)  although  others  are  pessimistic  about  such 
prospects (Shirley 2008). Scully (1992) asserts that better institutions in the form of freer markets, 
respect for property rights, and more democracy, enhance economic welfare through higher growth 
and more equal distribution of income and wealth. Aid used to develop the institutional framework 
can help pave the way to higher aid effectiveness (Hodler 2007).  
The  United  States  has  slowly  and  cautiously  acknowledged  these  problems.  The  United  States 
Agency  for  International Development  (USAID)  was  established  by  President  John  F  Kennedy’s 
Executive Order on November 3, 1961 as part of the Foreign Assistance Act passed earlier in the 
year by Congress. Creation of USAID marked a shift in US aid policy as it refocused aid efforts on 
long-term development goals instead of on military security and stability programs that had taken 
the place of the Marshall Plan upon its expiration.  Today USAID is the major source of the United 
State’s aid funding to countries across the globe as it seeks to promote economic development and 
democratization, as well as to help with disaster recovery.  According to its website, USAID “has the 
twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free 
markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world.”  The operating budget 
for USAID has grown considerably over time, topping $1 billion for the first time in FY 2009. 
While the aid-growth relationship has been studied for decades, there is a relatively new literature 
on aid effectiveness with respect to bolstering democratic institutions. In this paper we aim at 
contributing  to  this  infancy  literature  by  assessing  ways  by  which  ODA  can  help  foster 
democratization  or maintain  existing  democracy.  For  this  purpose,  we  analyze  US  aid  flows  to 
countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1998 to 2007 with a particular emphasis on their 
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effects  on  democracy,  measured  by  a  number  of  political  freedoms  indicators  developed  by 
Freedom House specifically for this region. This period is of interest as most of the observed 26 
countries had made their major transitions before 1998 and were in a period of strengthening or 
weakening  again  their  democratic  institutions.  With  the  renewed  emphasis  from  USAID  on 
democratization,  in  particular  toward  the  transition  economies,  it  is  useful  to  determine  how 
successful these programs have been. Brown (2008) is highly critical of USAID’s self-evaluation 
process, especially regarding Eastern Europe. He argues that agents care more about promoting a 
positive image of USAID rather than truly investigating how successful aid programs have been. 
Using Freedom House Nations in Transit data, we find that in simple linear regressions aid has 
generally not been a significant factor in a country’s overall democracy score. However, aid has 
significantly  contributed  to  several  components  of  the  democracy  score,  namely,  civil  society,  
electoral  process,  judicial  framework,  and  media  independence.  Aid  has  not  been  significantly 
related to corruption or governance. Finally, the impact of aid is found to depend on the number of 
years  of  past  central  planning.  Countries  having  less  than  50  years  of  central  planning  had  a 
significantly  negative  association  to  aid, whereas countries with more  than  65  years of  central 
planning benefited from greater aid. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is dedicated to a brief review 
on the literature regarding aid and institutions. In section 3 we discuss different channels through 
which the US aid can affect democratization in transition economies. The data and methodology 
used to test these hypotheses are described in section 4. Findings from the empirical analyses are 
discussed and interpreted in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Literature 
The  literature  on  aid  effectiveness  is  vast.  However,  Wichmann  Christensen,  Doucouliagos  and 
Paldam (2010) document this literature and show that it is dealing mainly with the effects of ODA 
on savings, investment and economic growth. Much less attention has been paid to institutions. 
Doucouliagos  and  Paldam  (2008)  find  that  on  average  there  is  not  a  positive  effect  of  aid  on 
economic  development,  although  this  does  not  exclude  individual  successes.  In  particular,  the 
evidence looks better for aid if it is incorporated in institutional analyzes (see below). This suggests 
that aid is not the primary driver of economic development. It may, however, be an indirect driver 
through institutional reform. In what follows, we briefly discuss the institutions literature. 
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A first step is to acknowledge that democracies are better equipped to enhance economic growth 
because the encompassing interest of an elected government in the well-being of the citizens is 
higher  than  the  interest  of  an  autocrat  (Olson  1993).  This  does  not  imply  that  democratic 
governments are benevolent; they have their own interests which can deviate from overall welfare 
aspects.  Nevertheless,  democratic  governments  are  expected  to  increase  social  welfare  in 
comparison to autocratic governments. This proposition has been tested empirically. One of the 
first papers1 to test this relationship is Barro (1996). His results for a sample of about 100 countries 
show a non-linear relation; increasing political rights improve growth at the margin but growth 
peaks  prior  to maximal freedom. His  explanation  is  that  beyond some  point  a more  expansive 
democracy allows for more rent-seeking and income distribution which retards economic growth. 
Barro also makes clear that this is not a causal relationship, as higher standards of living may 
encourage political liberalization.  
In analyses of the transition countries, several papers cluster around the questions raised by Barro 
(1996). The result of reversed causality that growth leads to reforms is supported by Krueger and 
Ciolko  (1998).  They  suggest  that  political  liberalization  can  be  endogenous  to  output  decline 
directly  after  the  beginning  of  transformation.  De  Melo,  Denizer  and  Gelb  (1996)  analyze  the 
positive effects of economic liberalization on price stability and economic growth with the help of a 
self-created reform index. Fidrmuc (2003) focuses on the relation between democratization and 
economic  liberalization  in  transition  economies.  Without  liberalization,  the  effects  of 
democratization  on  growth  remained  small.  Heckelman  (2010a)  shows  that  broad  democracy 
indexes created by Freedom House are positively correlated with economic growth in transition 
economies, but the effects can differ by democracy category. Apolte (2010) also shows that an 
increase  in  the  level  of  democracy  in  transition  economies  turns  out  to  be  growth  enhancing. 
Further, the estimated effect is stronger the lower is the initial level of democracy. This result is 
supported by earlier work from Falcetti, Raiser and Sanfey (2003), who also show that the effect of 
reforms on growth depends heavily on initial conditions.  
Next we proceed to the literature on aid and democratic reforms, which is rarely restricted to 
transition economies. Several papers find no effect of aid on growth conditional on institutions in 
developing  countries.  For  example,  Alvi,  Mukherjee  and  Shukralla  (2008a)  cannot  identify  a 
significant role of aid in the relation between reform and growth. However, they did not estimate a 
                                                            
1 An earlier survey is given by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990).  
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direct effect of aid on reform, but rather a multivariate regression on growth, including both aid and 
reform  as  potential  determinants.  They  find  that  aid  is  insignificant.  Economides  et  al.  (2008) 
conclude that aid benefits growth overall but the positive contribution from aid is largely off-set 
through  rent-seeking  activities,  and  the  harm  is  greater  the  larger  is  the  size  of  the  recipient 
government.  Murphy  and  Tresp  (2006)  find  little  support  for  the  argument  that  aid  is  growth 
enhancing even when the institutional setting is favorable.  
By contrast to the dismissive results, there is some support for the hypothesis that aid can affect 
growth in combination with political reform processes. Alvi, Mukherjee and Shukralla (2008b) in a 
second  paper  on  almost  50  developing  countries,  find  a  small  positive  effect  of  aid  in  a  joint 
estimation of aid and institutions on growth. The returns from aid are diminishing and their overall 
judgment is still cautious and does not assign a high influence to aid. In a similar analysis for about 
100 developing countries, Svensson (1999) shows that aid in combination with good governance 
supports economic growth. Yet, in the absence of mechanisms to control the government, aid is 
found to be abused for unproductive purposes, as suggested in theory by Landau (1990).  
Some studies deal explicitly with transition economies and the effect of aid on growth and policy 
reform respectively. One paper in particular replicates the positive effects of aid on growth when 
institutions are favorable, which have been shown for developing countries. In a panel estimation 
for 20 transition countries, Cungu and Swinnen (2003) show that the annual growth rate depends 
positively on aid and liberalization, and the effectiveness of aid is enhanced in more liberalized 
economies.  
A small but growing number of papers discusses the role aid plays directly for reforms. Most focus 
on  economic  rather  than  political  freedoms.  De  Haan  and  Sturm  (2003)  analyze  the  effect  of 
political reform on economic freedom, which is positive and significant for a sample of about 70 
developing countries. Aid adds to this effect only in very few equations. Heckelman and Knack 
(2008) find aid generally hinders economic reforms in a similarly-sized sample, but has a positive, 
albeit insignificant, coefficient when the time period is limited to the 1990s and further includes 17 
additional countries, 13 of which are former Soviet bloc nations. This suggests aid may have been 
more effective for economic freedom among the nations of the former Soviet Union (FSU) than for 
others. Metelska-Szaniawska (2009) estimates the effects of constitutional constraints on economic 
reforms in 20 transition economies. Although not the focus of his paper, she does find aid to have a 
positive and significant effect on the reform process in these countries for half of the regressions. 
Regarding political reforms, Knack (2004) concludes that aid had no effect in a large sample of 
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roughly 100 nations, using alternative measures of aid intensity and democracy indicators, whereas 
Djankov et al. (2006) find aid to be more harmful than the “resource curse” of oil production. In 
contrast, by focusing exclusively on 26 transition economies, Heckelman (2010b) finds that aid was 
supportive for political reform processes but only when aid was measured per capita, not per GDP.  
Furthermore, aid did not have a significant impact on media independence, but was significantly 
correlated with changes in four other political freedom categories. 
All  these  papers  analyzed  total  ODA  received  by  the  countries.  Individual  donors  may  have 
conflicting  goals  and  not  all  donors  necessarily  are  even  concerned  with  supporting 
democratization effects. In the following, we will estimate how one big donor country, the United 
States, and its aid policy affects the state of democracy in transition countries.  
 
3.  The Rationale of US Aid in Eurasia and CEECs 
To test how US aid is affecting the democratic development in the transition countries of Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia, we develop a central argument about the relation of aid and institutions, which 
takes into account the status of post-communist countries at the end of last century. This argument 
leads to two contradicting hypotheses.  
In his State of the Union address in 1994, President Clinton referred to the promotion of democracy 
as  the  “third  pillar”  comprising  his  foreign  policy  agenda.  He  emphasized  the  promotion  of 
“sustainable development” as the new, post-Cold War strategy for the foreign aid programs funded 
by  USAID.  Economic  assistance  supported  six  inter-related  goals:  achievement  of  broad-based, 
economic  growth;  development  of  democratic  systems;  stabilization  of  world  population  and 
protection of human health; sustainable management of the environment; building human capacity 
through education and training; and meeting humanitarian needs. President Bush later modified 
these  goals  around  what  he  referred  to  as  the  three  “strategic  pillars”  of  1)  economic  growth, 
agriculture, and trade; 2) global health; and 3) democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian 
assistance.  While  most  of  these  focus  on  long  range  institutional  capacity,  humanitarian  aid  is 
usually offered after specific traumatic experiences, such as the recent flooding in Moldova.  
Democracy  and  governance  promotion  was  not  originally  a  major  focus  for  USAID  funding; 
however,  the  amount  of  money  devoted  to  these  programs  in  recent  years  has  expanded 
significantly. Thomas Carothers acknowledges that the inclusion of democratization efforts into an 
agency  fundamentally  committed  to  socioeconomic  development  abroad  was  “hesitant  …  and 
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awkward” (Carothers, 2009, 14).  In the past 20 years, though, democracy promotion has become a 
pillar of USAID’s mission and the funding for democracy and governance has steadily increased. 
The transition economies received special attention upon the fall of the Soviet Union. Two new aid 
programs were funded through USAID. The SEED (Support for East European Democracy Act of 
1989) and the FREEDOM Support Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies 
and Open Markets Support Act of 1992) programs were designed to assist Eastern European and 
newly independent former Soviet Union (FSU) states develop democratic institutions and foster 
free  market  economies.  In  FY2004,  SEED  countries  were  allocated  $440  million  while  the  FSU 
received almost $600 million in appropriated funds. Analysis of USAID’s budget has shown the 
proportion of aid devoted to democratization in particular has almost doubled from 7.5% in 1990 
to 12.3% by 2005, with the largest regional support going to the transition economies of Europe 
and Eurasia, collectively accounting for $2.7 billion in real 2000 values over this period (Azpuru et 
al. 2008).   
As the focus of our analyzes is on the recipient countries and the effect of US aid on their democracy 
and political institutions, the main theoretical line of reasoning is that foreign official development 
aid can function as an indirect trigger to development in an environment of democratization and 
the further strengthening of democracy. Aid is both a resource to improve institutions and a means 
to overcome vested interests opposing further institution building. The first argument treats ODA 
as a means to shift the political budget constraint outwards. The government has more financial 
options to build up better public institutions, buy political support for more individual freedom or 
fund private activities directly.  
For the transition nations in particular, the resistance of vested interests to democratization and 
liberalization may be substantial and even increase after the initial shock in the early 1990s. Aid in 
this interpretation can help to support democratization. This view is in line with Vaubel’s (1991) 
dirty-work-hypothesis:  external  support  increases  the  chances  of  the  domestic  government  to 
pursue a policy reform. In the case of our study, the reform is an institutional one. The dirty work 
done by external forces is to build up and (as in our sample) maintain a structure. This can be done 
by strengthening all sorts of democratic forces, e.g. the civil society and the media. A strong civil 
society, a functioning education system and media as the fourth power in a democracy may well 
enhance a reform process (Freytag and Renaud 2007). 
Thus, the first hypothesis is that US aid to transition countries enhances democracy. This takes 
place through the quality of the electoral process, the expansion of civil society, and improved 
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transparency, which can be measured as judicial and media independence, governance and limiting 
corruption. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Tests performed by Fidrmuc (2003) suggest that the effect of democratization on growth is greater 
in an initial transition period than in later years, such as the decade we analyze (1998 through 
2007). We also would expect that countries which have already developed to a certain extent are 
less dependent on aid to foster democratization. In case of current European Union members, this 
can be seen in Table 1, which shows that USAID has concentrated much more heavily on non-EU 
members;  they  receive  on  average  over $10  per  capita  aid  whereas  the  eventual  EU  members 
received on average less than $1 per capita aid. In fact, most of the latter group stopped receiving 
any  assistance  from  USAID  at  some  point  during  our  sample  period.2 These  low  (or  no)  aid 
countries  serve  as  a  useful  control  but  as  shown  below,  our  initial  results  are  robust  to  their 
exclusion. 
In addition to this qualification, there is a counter-hypothesis. In a process of democratization in 
post-Soviet  type  society,  aid  may  also  prove  to  be  an  obstacle  to  institutional  improvements. 
Government officials may abuse the funds, in particular if they are focused on staying in power and 
using the power to generate their own income, want to buy political support from rent-seeking 
groups, or are able to corruptly pay off reformers. In such a setting, the effectiveness of aid may be 
reduced. If the use of ODA is difficult to control for the donor, aid inflows may constitute a means 
for  the  ruling  elite  to  weaken  or  even  reverse  democracy,  governance  and  transparency.  In 
particular  in  transition countries where  the  government already  has  ruled  for  a  long  time,  the 
willingness to allow for more political competition may decrease; examples include Belarus, the 
Ukraine  or  the  Russian  Federation.  Thus,  the  alternative  hypothesis  is  that  US  aid  granted  to 
transition economics is adverse to more democratic freedom. 
 
4.  Empirical Specification  
Our empirical formulation is taken from Fidrmuc (2003), who estimates a series of panel data 
models for the level of democracy from 1990 – 2000 specific to the transition nations. We 
supplement his basic specifications with the addition of official assistance levels from USAID. 
                                                            
2 For some countries, this occurred prior to official membership. 
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4.1. Democracy Scores 
Unlike  economic  growth,  democratization  is  difficult  to  quantify.  In  the  mid-nineties,  Freedom 
House created an annual index of democracy rating specifically for 29 transition nations of Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia, entitled Nations in Transit (NIT). This series largely mirrors in concept their 
other indexes on Political Rights and Civil Liberties they have reported on for over 150 countries 
since the 1960s.3 For the purposes of this study, there are two distinct advantages to the NIT data. 
First, the data are region specific and therefore are more likely to be uniformly measured than 
other global indexes. Second, Freedom House published scores on each distinct category included in 
the NIT index since the start in 1997, which was not done for the Political Rights or Civil Liberties 
index categories until  only  the  last few  years.  This allows  for  analyses  to  be conducted on  the 
separate types of political freedom used to measure overall levels of democracy. Aid may be more 
beneficial or harmful depending on the type of political freedom considered (Heckelman 2010b). 
Based on a survey of country experts, Freedom House rates each nation in NIT on a scale from 1-74 
for several categories which laregely coincide with the “democracy-building initiatives under SEED 
[which] have included support for free elections, nongovernmental organizations and civil society, 
independent media, transparent legal systems, anti-corruption measures, and local governance” 
(Cincotta  2009).  Formally,  the  NIT  categories  are  represented  by  (with  corresponding  SEED 
terminology in parenetheses): 
•  CIVIL SOCIETY (“nongovernmental organizations and civil society”) 
Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations, their organizational capacity and financial 
sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of 
free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process.  
•  CORRUPTION5 (“anti-corruption measures”) 
                                                            
3 Fidrmuc uses the original Freedom House democracy index, which is the average of the associated political 
rights and civil liberties indexes. 
4  Scores are assigned in quarter-point increments, effectively turning the 1-7 scale into a 25 point range. 
5  The Corruption index begins in 1999. 
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Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policy makers, laws on 
financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives.  
•  ELECTORAL PROCESS (“free elections”) 
Examines  national  executive  and  legislative  elections,  electoral  processes,  the  development  of 
multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process.  
•  GOVERNANCE (“local governance”) 
Considers  the  stability  of  the  governmental  system;  the  authority  of  legislative  bodies; 
decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and management of local governmental 
bodies; and legislative and executive transparency.  
•  JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK (“transparent legal systems”) 
Highlights  constitutional  reform,  human  rights  protections,  criminal  code  reform,  judicial 
independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantee of equality before the law, treatment 
of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.  
•  MEDIA INDEPENDENCE (“independent media”) 
Addresses  the  current  state  of  press  freedom,  including  libel  laws,  harassment  of  journalists, 
editorial independence, the emergence of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for 
private citizens.  
An  overall  democracy  score  is  then  computed  as  the  average  value  across  all  categories. The 
average  score  represents  a  scale  ranging  from  consolidated  democracy  to  consolidated 
authoritarian regime. In 2008, eight of these nations had an average democracy score classifying 
them  as  consolidated  democracies  (all  of  which  are  new  EU  members),  another  eight  were 
classified as consolidated authoritarian regimes (all of which are non-Baltic former Soviet states), 
and the remaining thirteen fell between these extremes. The overall democracy score assigned a 
country in NIT is highly correlated with the average value of its Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
scores (Heckelman 2010a), suggesting a strong consistency between the NIT index and the more 
popular,  older  indexes  published  by  Freedom  House.  In  these  indexes,  the  numerical  score 
represents a relative ranking, so smaller numbers correspond to a higher ranking. For example, 1 is 
the top ranking possible. To ease interpretation, we reverse the scale of the NIT index and each of 
its separate categories by subtracting it from 7. The inverted scores thus range from 0—6 where 
higher values now represent greater levels of democratic freedom.  
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows the average (inverted) democracy score for the region over time. Depressingly, after 
an initial increase, the democracy score shows a steady decline. By the end of the sample period in 
2007, democratization in the region appears to have fallen by roughly 8% from a high of 3.04 in 
1999.   
4.2. Control variables 
To explain the level of democracy, Fidrmuc (2003) includes as potential determinants the lagged 
value of the democracy index, the lagged value of an economic liberalization index created by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD), the log of real per capita GDP, the 
growth rate of the previous year, and an alternating series of proxies designed to capture western 
or Russian influence.6  We include each of these in our specifications. The EBRD transition index 
(taken from the EBRD website) represents the average of 14 separate categories, ranging from 1 to 
4.33, with 1 representing the least liberalized state. GDP data are taken from World Bank World 
Development  Indicators  database.  As  influence  measures,  Fidrmuc  considered  in  separate 
regressions the distance of a nation’s capital to EU-headquarters in Brussels,7 a dummy for Former 
Soviet Union, or the number of years of past central planning.8 The liberalization index and GDP 
variables are expected to positively influence democratization, whereas the influence variables (as 
measured) are expected to reduce democratization. 
4.3. Aid 
To Fidrmuc’s base specifications we add our key variable of interest, the amount of per capita aid 
received through USAID. Following the convention in the literature on (global) aid, our measure is 
                                                            
6  Fidrmuc also found a dummy for war years to be negative and significant but none of the countries were at 
war during our sample period. 
7  Specific distances are not available for Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan. Fidrmuc estimates these as 
6000 km, well in excess of the next furthest nation (Azerbaijan = 4321 km). We adopt Fidrmuc’s estimates. 
Our distance variable is measured in thousands of km. 
8  The three influence measures are highly correlated. The 15 FSU nations are on average 2100 km further 
from Brussels and experienced almost 20 additional years of central planning, compared to the remaining 
11 non-FSU nations. 
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based  on  all  aid received  through  USAID  although  it may  be useful  to separate  between  funds 
dedicated  to  democracy and  governance  versus  other ODA  (Azpuru  et al. 2008). However,  any 
earmarked  ODA  can  usually  be  easily  redirected.  There  is  also  the  difficulty  in  consistently 
identifying particular programs over several years. Thus earmarked ODA is likely to be a noisier 
signal for institutional support than using the full amount of ODA received.  In our regressions, 
USAID levels are normalized to per capita terms. We seek to determine if funds from USAID have 
been helpful or harmful to democratization when controlling for the factors listed above. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
Our  sample  includes  all  25  countries  considered  by  Fidrmuc  plus  the  country  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovenia.9 Following Fidrmuc, our regressions are based on pooled annual data with the value 
of a democracy index as the dependent variable. We utilize OLS with panel corrected standard 
errors clustered by country. Our sample runs from 1998-2007. Because not all countries received 
aid, as robustness checks on our initial regressions we also consider reduced samples which drop 
no-  or  low-  aid  countries.  In  addition,  we  also  separately  consider  the  underlying  categories 
comprising the democracy index. In those regressions, the lagged democracy score represents only 
that  particular  category.    Because  some  countries  received  the  lowest  possible  ranking  on 
individual  categories,  where  necessary  we  check  the  OLS  estimates  against  Tobit  estimates. 
Descriptive statistics on the full sample for all variables are presented in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
5.1.  Initial Regressions 
Estimates from the base specifications using the full sample appear in the first three columns of 
Table 3.  Each of  the  control  variables  generates the  expected sign, except  for  the  liberalization 
index, although none are statistically significant expect for the lagged democracy score and two of 
the influence measures. The lagged democracy coefficient is less than 1.0, consistent with Figure 1 
showing a reduction over time. However, the coefficient is only statistically significantly less than 
1.0  when  controlling  for  previous  years  of  central  planning  in  column  (3).10 This  regression 
                                                            
9  The  other  three  countries  currently  included  in  NIT,  Kosovo,  Montenegro,  and  Serbia,  were  grouped 
together as Yugoslavia until 2004. They are not included in our sample. 
10 P-values are 0.29, 0.31, and 0.00 for columns (1) – (3) respectively. 
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suggests  that,  controlling  for  the  other  factors,  a  nation  is  only  estimated  to  retain  95%  of  its 
previous democracy index score from one year to the next. Regarding the influence proxies, FSU 
nations were just over one-tenth of a point lower on the index scale (approximately 4% of the 
sample mean), even controlling for the previous year’s score. FSU nations also experienced, on 
average, 20 additional years of central planning. Estimates from column (3) suggest that these extra 
20  years  reduced  the  democracy  score  by  approximately  .16  points  (6%  of  the  mean  score). 
Distance from Brussels (column (1)) was not a statistically significant factor. We also ran additional 
regressions adding an EU dummy to each specification. The dummy took the value of 1 for EU 
membership  years  (starting  in  either  2004  or  2007  –  see  Table  1).  This  variable  was  never 
statistically significant, and its inclusion did not affect the other estimates. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Our key variable of interest, of course, is the aid measure. Although generating a positive coefficient, 
the marginal impact is miniscule and not statistically significant at conventional levels in any of the 
regressions.  Thus, initial analysis does not support the notion that aid is significantly helping to 
sustain the democratization process among Eastern European and Eurasian nations.   
During the sample period, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia basically did not receive any aid.11 
Their inclusion represents a control if they are able to maintain their political freedoms without the 
assistance from USAID. On the other hand, it may be of interest to limit the sample to actual aid 
recipient nations.  Dropping these nations in columns (4) – (6) does not alter signs or significance 
for any variable coefficients except that the economic liberalization variable is now (just barely) 
significant  at  the  10%  level when  controlling for  FSU  status.    The  inverse  correlation  between 
liberalized markets  and political  freedoms is  surprising  but consistent with many of  Fidrmuc’s 
(2003) results. The three dropped nations scored relatively high on both the liberalization and 
democracy  indexes,  so  their  prior  inclusion  somewhat  masked  the  potential  conflict  between 
openness in markets and democracy. Yet, the finding is not robust to any of the other specifications 
so we do not consider it to be of much importance. 
                                                            
11 Czech Republic did receive just over $200,000 worth of grants to support democratic reforms in one year 
(2002). In the two surrounding years, the level of assistance was less than $100,000 and recorded as 0.0 (in 
millions) in the USAID on-line database. Estonia and Slovenia did not receive any funding through USAID 
after 1997. 
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Four other nations which had been receiving aid also “graduated” from USAID several years before 
the end of the sample period. These include Lithuania (2002), Latvia (2003), Slovakia (2003) and 
Poland (2003).12 As shown in the final three columns of Table 3, dropping these four nations as well 
(making seven dropped total) does not affect any of the signs or significance levels from the full 
sample results reported in columns (1) – (3). 
5.2. Effect of aid by democracy category 
The  previous  set  of  results  does  not  support  the  idea  that  USAID  has  been  instrumental  in 
maintaining democratization among the EE and FSU nations. Yet, it still could be true that aid has 
been helpful for certain specific types of political freedoms, even if the overall democracy index is 
not affected. This notion is tested in Table 4 where the separate category scores replace the overall 
democracy index. 13 Each regression controls for the same list of determinants as in Table 3, but for 
brevity  only  the  aid  estimates  are  presented.  In  addition,  each  individual  category  except 
corruption has several nation observation-years with a value of 0, indicating the country received 
the lowest score possible in that year. Hence, the data may be censored and Tobit estimation is used 
as a check on the OLS estimates. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Aid always generates a positive coefficient, except for Governance. Whether positive or negative, 
the effect of aid on Governance is nowhere close to significant. Aid is always positively correlated 
with  freedom  from  Corruption,  but  again  is  never  significant.  Aid  does,  however,  appear  to 
significantly affect the Judicial index, although the significance levels are much weaker under Tobit, 
especially when controlling for distance or FSU status. For Media, aid loses its significance from OLS 
when  estimated  by  Tobit  except  when  controlling  for  years  of  central  planning.  Finally,  aid  is 
                                                            
12 Poland did receive a relative pittance (just over a half-penny per person) in 2005. Hungary did not receive 
any aid only in the last two sample years. 
13 In computing  the Democracy score, Freedom House  uses the average of these index scores so that all 
categories  have  1/6  weight.  Beginning  in  2005,  the  Governance  index  was  replaced  by  two  separate 
indexes representing National Democratic Governance (NDG) and  Local Democratic Governance (LDG). 
Rather than treating NDG and LDG as two distinct categories equal to the others (such as Media, etc.) with 
every category now having 1/7 weight in the democracy score, Freedom House instead uses the average of 
NDG and LDG as 1/6 weight. For consistency, we also use the average of NDG and LDG to continue the 
Governance series. 
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significantly  related  to  the  Civil  Society  and  Electoral indexes  in  each  specification  under  both 
estimation routines. 
In sum, results for aid are robust to the choice of influence proxy when using OLS, but somewhat 
sensitive under Tobit. Significance levels are also generally weakened under Tobit, indicating the 
OLS coefficient estimates may be biased upward, giving too much credit to aid. Still, aid is positively 
and significantly correlated with Civil Society, Electoral, Judicial, and Media, but only the first two 
are robust.14 
5.3. Non-linear effects from aid 
The effectiveness of aid may also depend on how critical is external support for the maintenance of 
democratization. That is, where political freedoms are least likely to be protected or nurtured by 
the domestic central governments when left on their own. To test this idea, we interact aid with the 
influence measures. Coefficients for the interaction terms would be expected to positive, indicating 
that  the  importance  of  aid  would  increase  the  greater  (lesser)  the  natural  Eastern  (Western) 
influence which occurs in the absence of aid. Results are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Interaction terms between aid and distance, and aid and FSU are not statistically significant in the 
first two columns. Furthermore, F-tests do not reject the null of no joint significance for the aid 
variables in either regression. The interaction term between aid and years of central planning in 
Column (3) is positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient on years of central planning is 
still negative and significant, indicating that in general a longer history of central planning limits the 
presence of political freedoms, in the absence of aid. The coefficient on aid by itself is also negative 
and significant suggesting that aid would retard democratization in a hypothetical nation which had 
never been subject to central planning. Of course, no such country exists in our sample exclusive to 
                                                            
14 Also of note is that each of the influence proxies are themselves always negatively correlated with each 
category score (not shown in the table). As was reported for the overall democracy score, years of central 
planning consistently achieves the strongest p-values. The FSU dummy is also statistically significant in 
each case except for Media. Thus, former Soviet republics do not have less media freedom, on average, at 
the margin, than the rest of the sample of Eastern European nations. However, being further from Brussels 
does result in significantly less media freedom, but surprisingly this is found only under Tobit estimation. 
The  same  is  true  for  Civil  Society,  Governance,  and  Electoral.  Distance  is  statistically  significant  when 
estimated by OLS for Judicial and Corruption. 
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transition nations. But the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term reveals that 
the harm from aid is mitigated the longer the country had been centrally planned. 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Table 6 we report on the marginal impact of a one standard deviation change in aid per capita, 
for various levels of years of central planning. Czech Republic and Slovakia had the fewest years of 
central planning in the sample, and a one standard deviation increase in aid ($13.4 per capita) 
would reduce the democracy scores of such countries by about 0.08, or 3% of the mean democracy 
score. Thankfully, the Czech Republic never received more than a half-penny per person in any 
given year, and aid to Slovakia ended halfway through the sample, suggesting the harmful impact of 
USAID throughout the period was much less in these countries than it otherwise might have been. 
Our estimates suggest the harm from aid is not eliminated until a country had undergone at least 61 
years of central planning. As reported in the second row, the countries coming closest without 
exceeding that threshold had only 47 years of central planning history in our sample. These eight 
nations also represent the median number of years of central planning. For these nations, a one 
standard deviation increase in aid represents a roughly 2% decline in the democracy index, which 
is still statistically significant at better than 10% level.  
Although the median countries were harmed by aid, a hypothetical nation at the mean number of 
years of central planning (55.5) would not be significantly affected by aid. The countries closest to 
the aid turning point of 61 years of central planning, identified in the next to last row, saw a small 
positive benefit from their aid after having previously undergone 67 years of central planning. Yet 
this effect is quite small; a one standard deviation increase in aid represents less than a 1% higher 
democracy rating. At the high end, Russia would be estimated to have benefited the most from 
USAID, with a one standard deviation increase yielding a 1.7% higher democracy score. 
Thus,  the  impact  of  USAID  is  decidedly  mixed.  A  majority  of  countries  (15)  are  below  the  aid 
turning  point  of  61  years  of central  planning and  thus estimated  to have  been harmed  by  aid. 
However, a majority of those (8) do not currently receive assistance from USAID. This leaves a 
slight majority (11 of 18) of continuing aid-recipients to be benefiting from their aid assistance. We 
are therefore unable to forcefully reject either of the two contradicting hypotheses about the role of 
official assistance from USAID for democratic institutions among transition countries in Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia.   
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6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we assess the effects of development assistance on democratic institutions in recipient 
countries.  Our  study  sheds  some  light  on  the  role  of  aid  in  building  and  in  defending 
democratization.  We  find  that  despite  assistance  from  USAID,  Eurasian  and  Eastern  Europen 
countries are generally unable to maintain and improve their democratic environment in the years 
after 1998. The positive influence of US aid has mainly been limited to judicial framework, civil 
society,  media  independence,  and  electoral  processes,  but  US  aid  does  not  significantly  affect 
governance  and  corruption.  The  first  three  categories  are  treated  within  the  Freedom  House 
taxonomy  as  components  of  civil  liberties,  whereas  the  remaining  categories  are  indicative  of 
various political rights. We also find that democratic freedoms are more strongly affected by aid if 
the recipient country suffered longer from central planning. In countries where central planning 
ended the longest time ago, aid is not helpful. Some have argued that focusing development aid on 
democratization  and  institutional  capacity  building  is  necessary  before  directing  aid  flows  into 
economic activity, because this sort of aid has been revealed to be growth enhancing, if at all, only 
in countries with better institutional settings. Thus, one modest lesson from the study can be that 
aid donors should concentrate aid flows on countries with low civil liberties and a longer history of 
central planning. 
Additional research would be helpful in explaining why support from USAID has been more 
successful in in the areas of judicial independence, civil society, media freedom, and electoral 
process, than in corruption and governance. This may require alternative methodologies, such as 
case studies on individual countries which have had varying degrees of success. Our study has 
shown USAID can help foster democratization in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, but only for certain 
types of political freedoms which are not revealed when using an aggregated index. It would be 
useful, then, to replicate this study for other parts of the world once enough years have passed to 
have a long enough time span to analyze the separate components of the original Freedom House 
democracy index that are now being released in the current editions.  
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Table 1: Average Level of Official Assistance from USAID, 1998-2007  
Country  Aid per capita   Years of no Aid  EU membership 
Albania  11.851     
Armenia  24.769     
Azerbaijan  4.268     
Belarus  0.845     
Bosnia and Herzegovina  28.015     
Bulgaria  3.960    2007 
Croatia  7.331     
Czech Republic  0.002  9  2004 
Estonia  0.000  10  2004 
Georgia  51.667     
Hungary  0.411  3  2004 
Kazakhstan  4.123     
Kyrgystan  2.488     
Latvia  0.184  6  2004 
Lithuania  0.443  6  2004 
Macedonia  14.039     
Moldova  14.863     
Poland  0.201  4  2004 
Romania  1.754    2007 
Russia  0.960     
Slovakia  0.963  5  2004 
Slovenia  0.000  10  2004 
Tajikistan  3.329     
Turkmenistan  1.234     
Ukraine  2.848     
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Table 2 Summary Statistics – 26 countries, 10 years 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev. 
Aid per capita  6.989  2.041  0.000  93.444  13.435 
Liberalization index  2.770  2.784  1.191  3.929  0.653 
Growth  6.457  6.070  -5.423  33.031  4.400 
Real GDP per capita  0.542  0.537  -2.062  2.590  1.030 
Distance  2.947  2.229  0.913  6.000  1.714 
FSU dummy  0.577  1.000  0.000  1.000  0.495 
Years Central Planning  55.539  47.000  41.000  73.000  12.546 
Civil Society index  3.164  3.500  0.000  5.750  1.908 
Corruption index  2.191  1.750  0.250  5.000  1.364 
Electoral index  3.164  3.500  0.000  5.750  1.908 
Governance index  2.732  2.500  0.000  5.250  1.604 
Judicial index  2.909  2.750  0.000  5.500  1.694 
Media index  2.910  3.000  0.000  5.750  1.775 
Democracy index  2.872  2.823  0.042  5.550  1.683 
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Table 3 Effect of Aid on Democracy 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Constant  0.120  0.125  0.611  0.154  0.193  0.664  0.108  0.259  0.592 
  (0.124)  (0.0832)  (0.171)  (0.131)  (0.0740)  (0.175)  (0.118)  (0.0542)  (0.175) 
  [0.333]  [0.134]  [0.000]  [0.240]  [0.010]  [0.000]  [0.364]  [0.000]  [0.001] 
Democracy  0.979  0.987  0.946  0.978  0.984  0.943  0.979  0.943  0.939 
lagged  (0.0196)  (0.0129)  (0.0141)  (0.0203)  (0.0132)  (0.0141)  (0.0221)  (0.0115)  (0.0193) 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Liberalization  -0.0107  -0.0243  -0.0134  -0.0150  -0.0366  -0.0169  -0.00395  -0.00333  -0.00425 
lagged  (0.0222)  (0.0233)  (0.0214)  (0.0224)  (0.0216)  (0.0202)  (0.0249)  (0.0145)  (0.0212) 
  [0.631]  [0.297]  [0.532]  [0.506]  [0.092]  [0.403]  [0.874]  [0.818]  [0.841] 
GDP per capita  0.0193  0.0116  0.0257  0.0178  0.00935  0.0227  0.00891  -0.0308  0.0130 
log  (0.0227)  (0.0170)  (0.0251)  (0.0266)  (0.0190)  (0.0281)  (0.0261)  (0.0137)  (0.0258) 
  [0.396]  [0.497]  [0.308]  [0.505]  [0.624]  [0.422]  [0.733]  [0.026]  [0.616] 
GDP growth  0.000619  0.00348  0.00128  -0.000832  0.00213  -8.89e-05  -0.000772  0.00180  -0.000654 
lagged  (0.00273)  (0.00280)  (0.00282)  (0.00263)  (0.00257)  (0.00268)  (0.00255)  (0.00232)  (0.00254) 
  [0.821]  [0.215]  [0.650]  [0.752]  [0.409]  [0.974]  [0.763]  [0.439]  [0.797] 
Distance  -0.0234      -0.0262      -0.0232     
  (0.0155)      (0.0166)      (0.0163)     
  [0.133]      [0.115]      [0.156]     
FSU    -0.123      -0.154      -0.270   
dummy    (0.0393)      (0.0414)      (0.0437)   
    [0.002]      [0.000]      [0.000]   
Years of      -0.00840      -0.00887      -0.00817 
Central planning      (0.00235)      (0.00251)      (0.00254) 
      [0.000]      [0.001]      [0.002] 
Aid per capita  0.000805  0.000742  0.00118  0.000774  0.000752  0.00119  0.000891  0.00131  0.00142 
  (0.000609)  (0.000526)  (0.000932)  (0.000618)  (0.000632)  (0.000991)  (0.000627)  (0.00100)  (0.000933) 
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  [0.187]  [0.160]  [0.208]  [0.212]  [0.236]  [0.231]  [0.157]  [0.194]  [0.130] 
R2  0.987  0.987  0.988  0.983  0.984  0.985  0.977  0.980  0.979 
No. observations  234  234  234  207  207  207  171  171  171 
No. countries  26  26  26  23  23  23  19  19  19 
Mean, dep var  2.86  2.86  2.86  2.58  2.58  2.58  2.10  2.10  2.10 
 
Notes. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample of 26 countries; columns (4)-(6) eliminates 3 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia) which never 
received any aid; columns (7)-(9) eliminates 4 more countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia) which stopped receiving aid during the sample 
period. Estimation by OLS with panel corrected standard errors clustered by country in parentheses with associated p-values in brackets.    
 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 01723 
 
Table 4 Effect of Aid on Democracy Categories  
Influence 
measure 
  Distance  FSU dummy  Years central 
planning 
Distance  FSU dummy  Years central 
planning  Estimation    OLS  OLS  OLS  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Democracy               
Civil Society    0.00174  0.00171  0.00206  0.00202  0.00215  0.00246 
    (0.000992)  (0.000591)  (0.000807)  (0.00114)  (0.00111)  (0.00107) 
    [0.081]  [0.004]  [0.011]  [0.075]  [0.052]  [0.021] 
Corruption    0.000106  0.000293  0.000462       
    (0.000692)  (0.000671)  (0.000616)       
    [0.878]  [0.663]  [0.454]       
Electoral    0.00174  0.00171  0.00206  0.00202  0.00215  0.00246 
    (0.000992)  (0.000591)  (0.000807)  (0.00114)  (0.00111)  (0.00107) 
    [0.081]  [0.004]  [0.011]  [0.075]  [0.052]  [0.021] 
Governance    -0.000172  -0.000253  0.000092  -0.000166  -0.000173  0.000169 
    (0.000873)  (0.000865)  (0.00112)  (0.00117)  (0.00111)  (0.00106) 
    [0.844]  [0.770]  [0.935]  [0.887]  [0.876]  [0.873] 
Judicial    0.00139  0.00146  0.00180  0.00147  0.00164  0.00197 
    (0.000648)  (0.000467)  (0.000800)  (0.000981)  (0.000964)  (0.000913) 
    [0.033]  [0.002]  [0.025]  [0.134]  [0.088]  [0.031] 
Media    0.00179  0.00181  0.00236  0.00203  0.00217  0.00266 
    (0.000757)  (0.000742)  (0.00117)  (0.00135)  (0.00136)  (0.00130) 
    [0.019]  [0.015]  [0.045]  [0.134]  [0.109]  [0.041] 
Notes. Each set of estimates for aid represents a different regression, controlling for the lagged democracy category score, lagged economic 
liberalization index, current GDP, lagged growth, and an influence measure. Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in brackets. OLS estimates 
use panel corrected standard errors clustered by country.
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Table 5 Non-linear Effects of Aid on Democracy  
    (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant  0.0898  0.128  0.917 
  (0.146)  (0.107)  (0.295) 
  [0.538]  [0.231]  [0.002] 
Democracy  0.982  0.987  0.924 
lagged  (0.0211)  (0.0139)  (0.0237) 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Liberalization  -0.0104  -0.0246  -0.0160 
lagged  (0.0218)  (0.0247)  (0.0237) 
  [0.635]  [0.320]  [0.502] 
GDP per capita  0.0215  0.0117  0.0226 
log  (0.0226)  (0.0170)  (0.0221) 
  [0.343]  [0.490]  [0.308] 
GDP growth  0.000835  0.00348  0.000370 
lagged  (0.00288)  (0.00279)  (0.00292) 
  [0.772]  [0.213]  [0.899] 
Distance  -0.0178     
  (0.0195)     
  [0.362]     
FSU    -0.125   
dummy    (0.0570)   
    [0.029]   
Years of      -0.0123 
Central planning      (0.00377) 
      [0.001] 
Aid per capita  0.00374  0.000558  -0.0184 
  (0.00431)  (0.00242)  (0.00867) 
  [0.387]  [0.818]  [0.035] 
Aid * Distance  -0.000782     
  (0.00102)     
  [0.445]     
Aid * FSU dummy    0.000225   
    (0.00265)   
    [0.932]   
Aid * Years Central Planning      0.000302 
      (0.000134) 
      [0.025] 








n  234  234  234 
Adjusted-R2  0.987  0.987  0.988 
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Table 6 Marginal impact from aid dependent on number of years of central planning 
 
Sample value  Number of years 
central planning 
Countries  Marginal impact  p-value 
Minimum  41  Czech Republic, Slovakia 
 
-0.081  0.063 
Closest below zero point 
(median) 
47   Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Slovenia 
 
-0.057  0.085 
Mean  55.5  --  -0.022  0.229 
 
Closest above zero point  67  Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan 
 
0.025  0.006 
Maximum  73  Russia  0.049  0.005 
 
Note: Net effect = 0 when number of years = 60.9 years. Marginal impact represents one standard deviation 
change in aid per capita. Calculations based on estimates from column (3) in Table 5. 
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